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Abstract
Countries of the Western Balkans (WB) – former federal 
units of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania have 
undergone a lengthy and complex process of democratisation from 
late 1980s. Free and fair elections are among the cornerstones of 
democratic consolidation. Even though the institutional setting for 
electoral management differs greatly across the globe, during the 
Europeanisation process it was widely recommended to transitional 
societies to set up independent electoral management bodies in 
other to guarantee fair electoral conditions, with standards mostly 
promoted by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (VC) 
and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA). Based on this influence, all the countries of the WB have 
established electoral commissions that are to great extent formally 
independent from the executive, with the intention of being less 
prone to electoral meddling. This is enhanced by regular election 
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monitoring in the region by the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the process being followed and 
evaluated by both the European Union institutions and member 
states as part of fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria to join the 
EU. This paper gives an overview of the institutional setting of 
electoral management in the WB that was created following the 
model of independent bodies and outlines main features of their 
design.
Key words: Western Balkans, electoral management bodies, 
electoral process, electoral integrity, independent bodies. 
Introduction
Free and fair elections are generally considered the corner-
stone of modern democracy. One of the preconditions for smooth 
functioning of the electoral process and its integrity1 are well func-
tioning and impartial electoral management bodies (EMB).2 This 
article, the first in a series, reports and explores the main features 
of the institutional setup of EMB in the Western Balkans and their 
role in the electoral process. The main goal of this analysis is to map 
these features.3 There are basically three models for EMB - Inde-
pendent, Governmental and Mixed Models. (Catt et al. 2014: 5-6)4 
In a transitional context, it is traditionally advised by international 
1) For a definition of electoral integrity see: Jeffrey. (2017).
2) As it was pointed by Mozaffar and Schedler: “This role is obviously important, 
although not well examined nor understood, in established democracies. But it has a 
special resonance in emerging democracies, where deliberate electoral manipulation 
and systematic fraud by recalcitrant authoritarian rulers unwilling to give up power 
have often blocked, derailed or truncated transitions to democracy. … Effective 
electoral governance alone does not guarantee good elections, of course, because 
a complex variety of social, economic and political variables affect the process, 
integrity, and outcome of democratic elections. But good elections are impossible 
without effective electoral governance.” (Mozaffar, Schedler 2002:6) 
3) The role and concrete examples of the EU Institutions and other international factors 
involved in the legal, political and cultural transformation of the Western Balkan 
societies in terms of developing institutional pre-conditions for free and fair political 
game will be examined in the next article in the series. 
4) See annex of this publication for the comprehensive list of the EMBs throughout 
the World.
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actors that political elites follow an independent model and set up 
an EMB accordingly. As the following analysis will demonstrate, 
this model has been followed by all countries of the region. A 
recent comparative analysis of democratic consolidation in Cen-
tral and Eastern European post-communist states, namely Serbia 
Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
still positions them within the group of “unconsolidated electoral 
democracies” (Merkel 2010: 20). One of the crucial questions for 
this kind of analysis is whether institutional setup really matters. 
Does it guarantee anything in terms of the quality of the electoral 
process? If it does, what are these contributions? As Mozaffar and 
Schedler put it: “To what extent, if any, does electoral governance 
determine the democratic quality of elections?” (Mozaffar, Schedler 
2002: 12) Even if not crucial, we still think examining the role 
and position of EMBs is needed for understanding the democratic 
processes in the societies and legal orders under observation. 
In this paper we are concentrating on central electoral man-
agement bodies that are generally in charge of overall organisation 
of elections and the calling of official results of parliamentary 
elections, and in some cases presidential elections. In this analy-
sis, we exclude bodies in charge of organising local and regional 
elections. The article gives an overview of the legal position of the 
electoral management bodies, their composition and the modes of 
appointment of their members, and the role of EMBs in electoral 
governance. We are doing that by looking into relevant constitu-
tional provisions, electoral laws regulating EMBs at the central 
level of the state, data provided by EMBs themselves, scarce lit-
erature and limited international accounts of electoral governance 
related to these very bodies (as opposed to wider monitoring of the 
electoral process).5 “As a new field of study and practice, election 
management has emerged from the areas of democracy-building 
and democratic consolidation” (Lopez-Pintor 2000:15), and even 
though the literature has grown significantly over the past two 
5) Neglected nature of study of EMBs are commonly mentioned by authors working 
in the field. Anne van Aaken also stresses that beside EMBs, electoral observer 
missions also remain under researched. See further: (Aaken 2009) As it was stressed 
by Mozaffar and Schedler - Electoral governance is a crucial variable in securing 
the credibility of elections in emerging democracies, but remains largely ignored 
in the comparative study of democratization (Mozaffar, Schedler 2002:1). 
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decades, scholarship is still limited for many regions of the World6 
and specifically legal scholarship in the area remains scarce. 
Setting the scene – do independent electoral bodies 
guarantee free and fair electoral processes?
Elections are complex political and legal processes. Elector-
al management bodies may be classified as only one of thirteen 
elements of electoral management.7 Other aspects, even though 
partially covered by this paper, remain outside the scope of the 
analysis. The term election management body (EMB) “has been 
coined to refer to the body responsible for electoral management 
whatever wider institutional framework is applied.” (Al-Musbeh 
2011:3) In a transitional context, electoral management design 
does have importance. As argued by Catt: “Electoral frameworks, 
including the choice of electoral system and the design of electoral 
administration, determine both the outcomes and the credibility of 
electoral processes and thereby trust in democracy.”8 The essential 
roles assumed by EMBs include: determining who is eligible to 
vote, receiving and validating the nominations of electoral partic-
ipants (for elections, political parties and/or candidates), conduct-
ing polling, counting the votes, and tabulating the votes.9 Back in 
2000, Lopez Pintor observed a worldwide trend of commissions 
developing as permanent and independent of the executive. He also 
stressed that electoral administration that relies on permanent and 
professional staff is more cost-effective than ad hoc electoral bodies 
based on empirical evidence (Lopez-Pintor 2000:11). As defined by 
 
6) Probably the first analysis of the implications of the electoral management design 
on the legitimacy of democratic processes in consolidating democracies (in African 
context) was done by Elklit and Raynolds. See further: (Elklit, Reynolds 2002).
7) ACE. Topic areas. The Electoral Knowledge Network. Available at: http://aceproject.
org/ace-en/topics [10.3.2019]
8) “The development of professional electoral administration is not merely a technical 
and managerial issue, but a process that crucially engages political stakeholders 
who have their own interests and objectives. Its role in the overall development 
and strengthening of democracy cannot be overstated.” (Catt et al. 2014: V).
9) “In addition to these essential elements, an EMB may undertake other tasks that 
assist in the conduct of elections and direct democracy instruments, such as voter 
registration, boundary delimitation, voter education and information, media moni-
toring and electoral dispute resolution.” (Catt et al. 2014: 5-6)
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IDEA – “The Independent Model of electoral management is used 
in countries where elections are organized and managed by an EMB 
that is institutionally independent and autonomous from the execu-
tive branch of government; its members are outside the executive. 
Under the Independent Model, the EMB has and manages its own 
budget, and is not accountable to a government ministry or depart-
ment. It may be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary or the 
head of state. EMBs under this model may enjoy varying degrees 
of financial autonomy and accountability, as well as varying levels 
of performance accountability.” (Catt et al. 2014: 7) In their study 
of EMBs from five regions of the World, Trebilcock and Chitalkar 
associate successful electoral experiences with independent and 
impartial EMBs vested with broad mandates (Trebilcock, Chitalkar 
2009). This model is widely used in emerging democracies and has 
been a policy fashion in the Western Balkans as well.10 
To study the institutional setting of EMBs, it is essential to 
observe the work of the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA)11 and the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission.12 This is coupled with regular monitoring of elections 
in the region by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE)13 and the process being followed and evaluated by 
both the European Union institutions and its member states as part 
of the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria to join the EU. IDEA 
defines the following guiding principles for EMBs: independence, 
impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, professionalism and 
service-mindedness. 14 Aspect of the institutional model that the 
International IDEA is pointing to are: institutional arrangement, 
10) International IDEA’s 2014 survey of electoral management in 217 countries and 
territories worldwide showed that 63 per cent followed the Independent Model, 23 
per cent the Governmental Model and 12 per cent the Mixed Model (the remaining 
2 per cent corresponds to countries that do not hold national-level elections). (Catt 
et al. 2014: 8) 
11) The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International 
IDEA). See further: https://www.idea.int/ [10.3.2019]
12)  The European Commission for Democracy through Law, see further: http://www.
venice.coe.int/webforms/events/
13) OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) regularly 
observe elections in many countries with well documented accounts on electoral 
process. See further: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections [10.3.2019]
14) See further for detailed description of these principles: (Catt et al., 2014: 21-24) 
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implementation, formal accountability, powers, composition, term 
of office and budget.15 These components are useful for the compar-
ative study of EMBs, including those in the observed region. The 
role and powers of the EMBs depend on the legal system and the 
extent to which electoral laws prescribe for EMBs to be involved 
in regulating the electoral process. Although some EMBs have 
executive, legislative and judicial powers, the majority primarily 
exercise executive powers relating to electoral implementation 
activities (Catt et al. 2014: 74). 
As a (normative) basis for the institutional design of electoral 
management bodies in the Western Balkans region, we can use 
Venice Commission Explanatory Report adopted at its 52nd Plena-
ry Session (Venice, 18-19 October 2002). This document outlines 
conditions/criteria that need to be met by electoral management 
bodies. This is a result of electoral observation experiences and 
reports prepared by the Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe observing “shortcomings concerning the 
electoral commissions”.16 This lengthy citation we find as crucial 
for determining why (potential) candidates in the European East 
were required to set up independent institutions: “In states where 
the administrative authorities have a long-standing tradition of 
independence from the political authorities, the civil service applies 
electoral law without being subjected to political pressures. It is 
therefore both normal and acceptable for elections to be organised 
by administrative authorities, and supervised by the Ministry of 
the Interior. However, in states with little experience of organising 
pluralist elections, there is too great a risk of government’s pushing 
the administrative authorities to do what it wants. This applies both 
to central and local government - even when the latter is controlled 
by the national opposition.” (Venice Commission 2002: 26-27). 
This normative stance clearly points to mistrust in consolidating 
democracies vis-à-vis the existence of proper public administra-
15) See further: (Catt et al. 2014: 9) For advantages and disadvantages of three models 
see (Catt et al. 2014: 20).
16) These included: lack of transparency in the activity of the central electoral com-
mission; variations in the interpretation of counting procedure; politically polarised 
election administration; controversies in appointing members of the Central Electoral 
Commission; commission members nominated by a state institution; the dominant 
position of the ruling party in the election administration. (Venice Commission 
2002: 27)
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tion with the ability to undertake the complex task of organising 
elections, suggesting that “new democracies” are not ready for the 
governmental type of electoral management. Therefore, according 
to the document, in countries with limited experience of organising 
pluralist elections (where “there is too great a risk of government’s 
pushing the administrative authorities to do what it wants”) it is 
needed to set - independent, impartial electoral commissions from 
the national (central) level to polling station level to ensure that 
elections are properly conducted.17 This can be considered the first 
criterion.
According to VC opinion, we can distinguish a second cri-
terion - Any central electoral commission must be permanent, as 
an administrative institution responsible for liaising with local 
authorities and the other lower-level commissions (Venice Com-
mission 2002: 27). It is further stipulated: “As a general rule, the 
commission should consist of: - a judge or law officer: where a 
judicial body is responsible for administering the elections, its 
independence must be ensured through transparent proceedings. 
Judicial appointees should not come under the authority of those 
standing for office; - representatives of parties already represented 
in parliament or which have won more than a certain percentage 
of the vote. Political parties should be represented equally in the 
central electoral commission; “equally” may be interpreted strictly 
or proportionally, that is to say, taking or not taking account of the 
parties’ relative electoral strengths.... Moreover, party delegates 
should be qualified in electoral matters and should be prohibited 
from campaigning.”18 The International IDEA Manual from 2014 
also stresses that organising/placing a secretariat of the EMB within 
the government, or as independent, comes with a number of advan-
tages and disadvantages. As our previous research on Serbia has 
demonstrated, albeit in a different filed of public affairs, having an 
independent body without a separate professional secretariat puts 
17) In more detail: “68. Only transparency, impartiality and independence from polit-
ically motivated manipulation will ensure proper administration of the election 
process, from the pre-election period to the end of the processing of results. (Venice 
Commission 2002: 26-27). 
18) Report additionally advises for the inclusion of the representatives of national 
minorities and a representative of the Ministry of the Interior, if the given historical 
context of the country does not preclude from the second option. (Venice Commis-
sion, 2002: 27).
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members of the commission at risk of being completely dependent 
on the work of government employees who might, in turn, influence 
the decisions of the members of the commission and undermine 
the very independence they ought to enjoy.19 
The Venice Commission has also considered electoral obser-
vation experiences regarding transfers of responsibilities from a 
fully-fledged multi-party electoral commission to an institution 
subordinate to the executive. Therefore, the third criterion is that 
- co-operation between the central electoral commission and the 
Ministry of the Interior is possible only for practical reasons, e.g. 
transporting and storing ballot papers and other equipment (Venice 
Commission 2002: 27). 
A fourth criterion we can extract from the Commission 
Report opinion is that bodies that appoint members to electoral 
commissions should not be free to recall them, as it casts doubt on 
the independence of appointees.20 As a fifth criterion we can distin-
guish adoption of decisions by high majority (2/3) and preferably 
by consensus of members (Venice Commission 2002: 28). As the 
sixth criterion we distinguish having Commission members with 
specialised skills to organise elections and preferably composed of 
legal experts, political scientists, mathematicians or “other people 
with a good understanding of electoral issues” (Venice Commission 
2002: 28). The document also contains recommendations for inclu-
sion of party members, right of members to speak in the sessions, 
openness of commissions’ meetings to the public and especially 
media including access to all documents, creation of lower level 
(regional commissions) in similar fashion, training of electoral 
staff and obligation to provide technical aid to central commission 
by executive branch (Venice Commission 2002: 28-29). None less 
important feature of the independence of any (regulatory) body is 
its financing. In the case of EMBs, this is a hugely variable given 
the fact that elections are generally run every four to five years and 
expenses will vary accordingly.21
19) We have already studied this phenomenon in the case of state aid reforms in the 
country. See further: (Milenković, 2018 a,b).
20) It is further stressed that discretionary recall is unacceptable, but recall for disci-
plinary reasons is permissible - provided that the grounds for this are clearly and 
restrictively specified in law. (Venice Commission, 2002: 27).
21) For a detailed overview of comparative examples and most pressing issues see: 
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Here we point again to a basic distinction between electoral 
management as practiced in developed/old/established democracies 
and states on the path to consolidation of democratic structures. Van 
Ham and Lindberg have examined the influence of institutional 
design (Ham, Lindberg 2015) on electoral integrity by employing 
data obtained thorough the V–DEM project.22 They point to the fact 
that the model of independent institution have been “championed” 
in the previous period23 but also find that global comparative studies 
appear to show that EMB institutional design is either negatively, 
or only very weakly related to election integrity. They propose 
that in contexts of high quality of government (QoG) and higher 
levels of democracy, “EMB institutional design is inconsequential 
for election integrity, because the bureaucracy already operates 
professionally and other partial regimes of democracy are well 
established.” For that type they point to systems like Sweden and 
Norway. On the other hand, “In countries with low QoG and stur-
dy electoral autocracy ... EMB institutional design may not affect 
election integrity either. If the bureaucracy and other political insti-
tutions are captured and controlled by authoritarian incumbents, 
the particular institutional design of EMBs should make little dif-
ference.” For this second type they give examples of Congo and 
Russia. Finally, in contexts of medium QoG and medium levels of 
democracy they argue that “EMB institutional design should be 
expected to strengthen election integrity, as in these cases, formally 
independent EMBs should have both stronger de facto autonomy 
and greater capacity to administer and monitor elections.” (Ham, 
Lindberg 2015: 455-456). This is especially relevant for the study 
of the Western Balkans given the varied democratic development 
and rising tendencies towards authoritarianism and stabilocracy.24 
With this analytical framework in mind, we will proceed to study 
the features of electoral management bodies in the Western Balkans.
(Catt et al. (2014: 207-220)..
22) For more details on V-DEM see: https://www.v-dem.net/en/ [10.3.2019]
23) Explicitly pointing to widely referenced works by Lopez Pintor for UNDP and works 
by International IDEA 2006 (updated in 2014) – both cited multiply in this paper.
24) BiEPAG. The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism 
and EU Stabilitocracy. Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group. Available at: 
https://biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/BIEPAG-The-Crisis-of-Democ-
racy-in-the-Western-Balkans.-Authoritarianism-and-EU-Stabilitocracy-web.pdf 
[10.3.2019]
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Main features of Electoral management systems in the 
countries of the Western Balkans
In the previous two decades, all the countries of the Western 
Balkans have opted for some kind of independent institution fol-
lowing the widely promoted institutional design for consolidating 
democracies. There could be two explanations for this. The first, 
and less likely, is that this trend can be compared to a great extent 
with the “fashionable” diffusion of public agencies as a way of 
organizing administration across the jurisdictions in 1990s and 
early 2000s.25 The second, and more plausible one, would be accep-
tance of this form of electoral management as explicitly and/or 
implicitly required to be considered a democratic regime. 
In Serbia, the Republic Electoral Commission (REC)26 is 
established through Law on the election of members of the Parlia-
ment.27 Members of the Republic Electoral Commission and their 
deputies are appointed for a period of four years, while members 
of polling boards and their deputies are appointed for each election 
(article 30). The standing composition of the Republic Electoral 
Commission consists of the Chairperson and sixteen members 
appointed by the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 
while the enlarged composition also includes one representative 
of each submitter of the electoral list.28 The Republic Electoral 
Commission has a Secretary, appointed by the National Assembly 
of the Republic of Serbia from among the experts in its services, 
who participates in the work of the Commission without the right 
to make decisions. According to the Law, the National Assembly 
of the Republic of Serbia ensures the conditions necessary for the 
work of the Republic Electoral Commission (article 35) which in 
practice means that the administrative staff is recruited from the 
25) See further: Pollitt, et.al. (2001).
26) http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/english/index.php
27) Law on the election of members of the Parliament “Official Gazette of the RS” 
No. 35/00, 57/03 – Decision of the Constitutional Court, 72/03 – other law, 18/04, 
85/05 – other law, 101/05 – other law, 104/09 – other law, 28/11 – Decision of the 
Constitutional Court 36/11.
28) The Republic Electoral Commission also has one member, a representative of a 
state organization responsible for statistics, who shall participate in work of the 
Commission without the right to make decisions. For inclusion of representatives 
of electoral lists see article 39.
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poll of Parliament secretariat employees. Therefore, the Secretary, 
along with the other administrative/secretarial staff of the ERC, 
is not completely independent from the Parliament; indeed, as 
Parliamentary employees, they are susceptible to pressure from 
the parties in control of Parliament. The Republic Electoral Com-
mission has a number of competences, and also adopts its Rules of 
Procedure. The Chairperson, members of the Republic Electoral 
Commission and their deputies must hold a BA degree in law, 
closing the composition professionally which is one of the known 
policy options recognized comparatively with set of advantages 
and disadvantages.29 To sum up, although the Commission is de 
lege independent, it is potentially susceptible to significant influ-
ence by the parties forming a majority in the National Assembly; 
furthermore, the budget is appropriated from the central budget of 
the State with no separation and the secretariat is effectively within 
the Parliament. This approach is cost-effective on the one hand, 
but creates a situation where the work of the electoral commission 
could come under the undue influence of the parliamentary majority 
on the other. Therefore, it could be advisable to establish a separate, 
permanent secretariat, in spite of higher operating costs.30
Next in our analysis is Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is 
specific for many reasons. First, for existence of a transitional 
EMB set up by the international community in the aftermath of the 
war that raged between 1992 – 1995.31 After this transitional post 
war period, the Electoral Law was adopted in 2001, and as noted 
by Hadžiabdić: “It represented a great success and was the result 
of efforts of the international community, negotiations among the 
political parties, and the patience of BiH citizens.” (Hadžiabdić 
2014: 329). The transitional nature of the electoral commission 
continued up until 2006, some ten years after the war, as some of 
the members of the commission were foreign The current system 
29) See further: Catt, et al. (2014) 
30) However, there have been no objections and recommendations from international 
actors to this regard, probably in line of allowing countries to keep things organised 
according to their respective constitutional and administrative traditions.
31) Mostly, international EMBs are an outcome of international, regional and national 
efforts to manage conflicts and/or post conflict environments, and they are normally 
sponsored and set up by international or regional organizations such as the United 
Nations (UN) and it consist of, or include, international experts as members. (Kumar 
1998) 
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of electoral rules in BiH is reflective of its complex constitutional 
structure consisting of federal entities, special district, cantons 
and municipalities (Hadžiabdi, 2014: 329). Therefore, the elector-
al management system of the country is very multifaceted, with 
different elections organized by different bodies at various levels 
of governance. The main electoral body in the country is the Cen-
tral Electoral Commission of Bosnia and Hercegovina32 which 
is comprised of seven members in accordance with the Election 
Law of BiH.33 The Secretariat of the BiH Election Commission is 
established by the decision of the Commission and it is in charge 
of “professional and administrative-technical duties” for the BiH 
Election Commission (article 2.11). Pursuant to article 2.6 of the 
BiH Election Law, the President of the BiH Election Commission is 
appointed amongst its members. Each member of the BiH Election 
Commission, a Croat, a Bosniak, a Serb and a representative of the 
Others34, according to the Law perform the duty of the president 
of the BiH Election Commission according to the rotation prin-
ciple, once in seven years for the period of twenty-one months. 
There is also complex system of financing the electoral process in 
place (article 1.2a) which is in line with the multilayer structure 
of atypical federation created by the Dayton agreement. It can be 
concluded that the complexity of the Bosnian electoral system is 
the result of the post-conflict societal context, multi-ethnic setup 
of the society, and the complicated constitutional architecture of 
the country and its entities. 
The only country of the Western Balkans that has become 
an EU member state is Croatia, whose specific institutional design 
allows for the independence of the electoral governance. The State 
Election Commission of the Republic of Croatia was established in 
2006 and is a permanent and independent state body according to 
32) http://www.izbori.ba/ [10.3.2019]
33) The Law has been subject to numerous changes since 2001. Available at: http://
www.izbori.ba/Documents/documents/ZAKONI/BiH_Election_Law_last_consol-
idated_version_2018.pdf [10.3.2019]
34) Others - Citizens not belonging to any of three constitutive ethnic groups. This 
omnipresent ethnic concept in Bosnia and Hercegovina has led to numerous consti-
tutional and human rights challenges leading to landmark Judgement of European 
Court of Human Rights in case Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia and Hercegovina. See 
inter alia: Bardutzky (2010).
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the Law on State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia35 
(article 2). The Commission is comprised of nine members - the 
Chairperson, four Vice-Chairpersons and four members, elected 
according to the procedure stipulated by the Law (article 3). The 
Chairperson of the Commission is the President of the Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Croatia (article 4), two Vice-Chairpersons 
are elected by Supreme Courts’ General Assembly among judg-
es of that Court, based on the proposal of the Croatian Supreme 
Courts’ President (article 5), with further two Vice-Chairpersons 
and remaining four members of the State Electoral Commission are 
elected by the majority vote of all representatives of the Croatian 
Parliament (article 7). According to the Law, one Vice-Chairperson 
and two members are nominated by the majority political party 
or coalition, and the other Vice-Chairperson and two members 
are nominated by the opposition political parties or coalitions 
(Article 7), in accordance with the party structure of the Croatian 
Parliament at the time of the election. The Law also envisages for 
a relatively long mandate of eight years, a characteristic which 
contributes to the permanence of the Commission and its stability 
irrespective of electoral cycles. The competences of the SEC are 
stipulated by article 11 of the Act and include, among others, pre-
senting opinions on additions and improvements to the electoral 
and referenda legislation. The Croatian SEC has a dual role as it 
also oversees the annual financial performance and annual finan-
cial reports of political parties, independent MPs, and members of 
representative body of local and territorial (regional) government 
elected from the list of a group of voters.36 The Commission also has 
permanent Secretariat/Expert service. Within the Expert Service, 
there is a Financial Department that is in charge of supervising 
political activities and electoral campaign financing. However, 
despite good formal setup, in Croatian case we can also observe a 
classical problem of lack of resources on disposal to the electoral 
Commission in order to conduct its functions. The Commission 
became an independent (and permanent) state body back in 2007 
but did not have its offices until the end of 2010.37 However, overall 
35) Official Journal of the Republic Croatia, No. 44/06 and 19/07. 
36) See further: https://www.izbori.hr/site/en/about-the-commission/competence/
competences-of-the-state-electoral-commission-relating-to-the-political-activi-
ties-and-election-campaign-financing-supervision/1748 [10.3.2019]
37) http://www.izbori.hr/ws/index.html?documentId=039CA1E2CE93551AC-
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it is possible to conclude that the complex system of electing the 
Commission members, together with the professional and separate 
existence of the secretariat, establish a foundation on which a sound 
electoral process can take place.
Montenegro, with just over 650.000 inhabitants, is one of the 
smallest countries in Europe. Although it has progressed further in 
the EU integration process than other current candidates for EU 
membership, it has experienced continued rule by the same par-
ty—a successor of the Communist party38—since first democratic/
multiparty elections held in 1990. Montenegro has an independent 
State Election Commission (SEC). 39 The body has legal capacity 
and a Secretariat. It is comprised of eleven permanent members and 
is being extended by one more authorized representative of each of 
the submitters of electoral lists thus making this a combined body. 
The permanent members are appointed for the period of four years 
by the Parliament, while the head of the Commission is elected by 
the SEC itself. Among permanent members, four are appointed on 
proposal of majority in the Parliament and four on proposal of the 
opposition. Specific solution is envisaged for the Secretary of the 
Commission as one of the SEC members appointed on the proposal 
of the opposition is acting as Secretary.40
Northern Macedonia was a prime example of EU condition-
ality being put into practice in the context of the integration pro-
cess, as attested by Giandomenico (Giandomenico 2013). Before 
2006, the Macedonian Commission was an ad hoc body without 
any full-time staff; while a secretariat had been provided for by 
the law, it was not set up. The members, including judges, were 
effectively political representatives. Since 2006, the State Election 
Commission (SEC) has been a full-time body and the secretariat 
has been inaugurated.41 
1257C5C004703E9 [10.10.2017]
38) See further: Vuković (2015).
39) See further: http://dik.co.me/en/ [10.3.2019]
40) See further: Law on Election of Councilors and Members of Parliament, Official 
Journal no. 4/98 and subsequent amendments.
41) See further: (Giandomenico 2013:76). 
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The Electoral Code in Northern Macedonia has been subject 
to numerous amendments since 2006.42 According to article 26, the 
SEC is composed of a president, vice-president and five members. 
The member’s term in office used to be 4 years, but with recent 
amendments from 2018 was shortened to 6 months, which is highly 
dubious solution in terms of meeting the criterion of EMB being 
permanent.43 The Parliament announces the election of the presi-
dent, vice-president and the members of the SEC in the “Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia” and in daily newspapers. 
The Law prescribes for a peculiar appointment procedure for the 
Commission members. The vacancy remains open for 8 days from 
the day of its publication, which is rather short period of time 
for a public call. The Parliamentary Committee on Election and 
Appointment Affairs prepares a draft list from the candidates who 
have applied and submits it to the Parliament. From the candidates 
on that draft list, the political parties in opposition nominate the 
president of the State Election Commission and two members of 
the SEC and the ruling parties nominate the vice-president and 
three members of the SEC. The president, vice-president and the 
members of SEC are elected by the Parliament with a two-third 
majority of the Members of Parliament, which in practice means 
that a wide multi-party agreement needs to be reached in order to 
have the Commission elected. (article 28) The State Election Com-
mission is a separate legal entity and has a Secretariat comprised 
of a Secretary General appointed for a five-year period and his 
or her deputy. A support service (professional service as defined 
by the Code) is also established for the State Election Commis-
sion. It is charged with executing the professional/administrative 
and organizational/technical responsibilities of the State Election 
Commission and is headed by the Secretary General. The resources 
for the work of the State Election Commission are provided from 
the state budget. In spite of numerous international engagements 
with the electoral process and design in the country numerous 
problems remain. 
Albania is an interesting study case for at least two reasons. 
First, for prolonged international involvement in the oversight of 
42) Electoral Code, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 40/06 and sub-
sequent amendments.
43) Compare article 27 of the Electoral Code.
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legislative drafts, thus establishing direct influence on the creation 
of electoral management in the country. The second is the setting up 
of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) in articles 153 and 154 
of Albania’s Constitution. The Commission is a permanent body 
made up of seven members. The Assembly of Albania adopted The 
Electoral Code in 2008 but has amended it (with external consul-
tancy) several times.44 Albania is a specific case among Western 
Balkan States as its legislators have opted for one comprehensive 
Electoral code, as opposed to having electoral process regulated by 
several different acts. It contains detailed provisions on the CEC. 
Members must fulfill a complicated set of conditions guaranteeing 
their impartiality.45 Furthermore, according to article 12, the mem-
ber must fulfil following criteria: not be convicted of a crime; has 
not been a member of any political party in the last 5 years; has 
not been elected a deputy of the Assembly in the last 5 years; that 
he or she was not a member of the State Police, Armed Forces 
and State Intelligence Service in the last 5 years; and that has not 
been dismissed from the public administration or any other public 
function due to a violation. This is by far the most elaborate list of 
conditions EMB membership of any state in the region. According 
to the Law, members of the CEC have a 6-year mandate with the 
right to be reelected. The Chair of the CEC has a 4-year mandate 
with the right to be reelected. A member of the CEC exercises this 
duty full time and his/her function is incompatible with any other 
political, public or private duty or function, with the exception of 
teaching (article 13). This way Albania has opted for professional 
independent members. Finally, the Law also provides for a secre-
tariat which is managed in the same manner as other independent 
institutions in the country (article 25). Interestingly, the CEC itself 
is not defined by the Electoral code as an independent institution 
but rather that “CEC member shall exercise his/her function in an 
independent manner” (article 17). It was assessed that the Alba-
44) Law no. 10 019, dated 29 December 2008, amended by Law no. 74/2012, dated 19 
July 2012 and Law no. 31/2015, dated 2 April 2015.
45) With requirements for a member to be: older than 35 years; hold a higher education 
degree; has a professional experience of no less than 10 years of work, in at least 
one of the following fields: i. law; ii. public administration; iii. administration of 
elections; and interestingly - iv. a director of non-profit organizations that have as 
their object the protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms, the conduct 
of democratic elections or public policy. (article 12)
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nia’s Electoral Code provides a thorough technical foundation for 
democratic elections, according to a Joint Opinion by the OSCE 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission,46 as both institu-
tions have been very involved in helping the country develop its 
electoral rules. However, as in other countries of the region, many 
challenges still prevail.
Kosovo(*)47 is the last in this analysis. Kosovo occupies a 
unique space as its sovereignty is not recognized by approximately 
half of UN members, including five EU member states, following 
its 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia. As in 2008, it 
still is, partially under international governance. Various human 
rights problems remain. There is a Central Election Commission 
(CEC)48 in place, but the OSCE remains involved in the process.49 
According to article 139 of the Constitution of Kosovo, the CEC is 
a permanent body, which prepares, supervises, directs, and verifies 
all activities related to the process of elections and referenda and 
announces their results. The Commission is composed of eleven 
members with a chair appointed by the President of Kosovo from 
among the judges of the Supreme Court and courts exercising 
appellate jurisdiction. Six members are appointed by the six larg-
est parliamentary groups represented in the Assembly, which are 
not entitled to reserved seats. One member is appointed by the 
Assembly deputies holding seats reserved or guaranteed for the 
Kosovo Serb Community, and three members are appointed by the 
Assembly deputies holding seats reserved or guaranteed for other 
Communities that are not in majority.
Concluding remarks
Western Balkan societies have gone a long way since the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and Albania’s split with communism. 
46) http://www.osce.org/odihr/86441 [10.3.2019.]
47) Kosovo(*), Republic of Kosovo is in many international forums and by the European 
Union referred to with Asterisk which reads: “This designation is without prejudice 
to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ opinion 
on the Kosovo declaration of independence”.
48) For further info see:http://www.kqz-ks.org/an/ [10.3.2019.]
49) https://www.osce.org/mission-in-kosovo/elections [10.3.2019.]
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However, numerous transitional challenges remain. All countries of 
the region have decided to establish some sort of the independent 
electoral commissions, as it was advocated by leading interna-
tional initiatives in the field to be a right model for consolidating 
democracies. However, many features across the region point to 
semi-dependent nature such as the absence of a secretariat, involve-
ment of high number of representatives of political parties, or lack 
of financial and other resources. Out of six criteria based on the 
Explanatory Opinion of the Venice Commission defined in part 
two, analysis indicates that many national institutions are missing 
some. However, institutional design alone is not a guarantee of the 
quality and integrity of the electoral process, and the wider societal 
and political context should be taken into account. As outlined 
above, models of independent institution have been “championed” 
in the previous period, but findings of global comparative studies 
appear to show that EMB institutional design is either negative-
ly, or only very weakly related to election integrity, even though 
there are indications that independent EMBs should be able to 
contribute to electoral integrity in countries with medium “quality 
of government,” a conclusion bearing relevance for the Western 
Balkans region. Finally, it should be noted that further analysis of 
various influences on electoral process and management design are 
needed, especially in the context of European Union conditionality 
and accession process for the region.
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